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Data reported in the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Current Population Survey (CPS) 
show that wage inequality among American workers has grown markedly over the last 
three decades (see Levy and Murnane [1992]).  This rise is apparently at the root of much 
of the recent increase in the inequality of family income and has fueled an intense debate 
about the shrinking middle class. 
Are changes in human resource management (HRM) behind the increase in wage 
dispersion, and, if so, what challenges will this pose for companies in the years ahead? To 
answer these questions, I look at the implications for HRM policy of the rising wage 
disparity found in a three-decades-long salary survey conducted by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Cleveland (FRBC) (Groshen [I99 lb]). 
The analysis reveals that the wages of two hypothetical nonproduction workers 
who differed in both occupation and employer would have pulled apart over the last three 
decades even if both remained in the same positions. The paper then explores which 
aspect of their jobs mattered most:  occupation, employer, or individual differences. 
I.  The FRBC Salary Survey 
Few data sets provide information on wages and employers, and no public survey 
offers occupational and employer detail for a longitudinal sample. The data set studied 
here, gathered from an annual private salary survey conducted in Cleveland, Cincinnati, 
and Pittsburgh by the FRBC Personnel Department over the last 33 years, has all of these 
desired features. The number of participating firms has grown over time and averages 83 
per year.  Cincinnati firms usually make up one-quarter of the sample, with Cleveland and 
Pittsburgh evenly represented in the balance. 
I use "employer" to mean the employing firm, establishment, division, or collection 
of local establishments for which wages are reported.  Since a participant's choice of the 
entities to include presumably reflects those for which wage policies are administered 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmjointly, the ambiguity is not particularly troublesome. The employers surveyed are 
generally large and include government agencies, banks, manufacturers, trade companies, 
utilities, universities, hospitals, and insurance firms. 
The number of occupations surveyed each year ranges from 43 to 100, with each 
employer reporting wages for an average of 27 categories.  The jobs surveyed are mostly 
nonproduction positions that can be found in nearly all industries, and many are divided 
into grade levels.  The comple& data set has more than 75,000 observations, each giving a 
year's mean or median salary for those working in a surveyed occupation. Cash bonuses 
are considered to be part of salary, but fringe benefits are not.  From 1980 through 1990, 
individual salaries within job cell are also available. 
Techniaue 
The FRBC data allow the effect of employer wage policies to be examined through 
variations within and between two well-identified characteristics of employment: 
occupation and employer, neither of which is well defined in household surveys such as 
the CPS.  Within a salary survey framework, a group of workers in a specific occupation 
(e.g.,  job i) for a specific employer (e.g., fm j) is said to belong to "job cell ij."  The 
mean wage for this cell can be described as the sum of four components: 
where wjj = log mean (or median) wage of employee in job cell ij; p = log mean wage for 
the entire sample; pi = occupation i differential;  = employer j differential; and % = 
internal labor market QLM) differential for job cell ij. 
Occupational coefficients estimate the average wage difference (over the mean 
wage in the city) paid to the occupation.  Since even fairly broad occupational categories 
capture much of the variation picked up by standard measures of human capital (Groshen 
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estimated occupational coefficients reflect the product of the average human capital in the 
occupation times the return to human capital.  Similarly, the coefficient on an 
establishment dummy is the wage premium paid to the average occupation by that 
employer, and it estimates the establishment's  level of wage-relevant attributes (such as 
size and industry) multiplied by the return to those attributes. An ILM differential is 
compensation, paid by an employer to a particular occupation, that falls above (or below) 
the average differential paid by the employer. Essentially, ILM differentials pick up 
idiosyncratic internal wage ratios. 
Salary surveys are not  random samples of the population, and entry and exit from 
them do not necessarily reflect market forces. Thus, surveys are best suited to exploring 
changes in wages rather than changes in the distribution of jobs.  Since a simple time path 
of the standard deviation of wages among cells in the FRBC data does not control for the 
possibility that the survey may have expanded to include more diverse occupations and 
firms, Groshen (1991b) compensates by using  "rolling samples."  Between any two years, 
the change in variation is measured only for the subsample of job cells present in both 
years.  These changes are then added to the cumulative sum of previous changes plus the 
initial variance to obtain the total variance for a hypothetical, unchanged sample. 
When the composition of jobs is held constant over time, a change in wage 
variance will be due to changes in either wage structure or the attributes of occupations 
and employers over time. In this context, if occupations are not equally represented 
within each employer, the variance of wages is 
Changes in the variance of wages among constant job cells are composed of changes in 
one or more of these terms.  To obtain wage dispersion, a fifth term for within-cell, or 
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component of total wage variation can be examined only during the 1980s in the FRBC 
sample. 
11.  Results 
Table 1  summarizes the results for standard deviations after controlling for 
compositional changes.  Distribution changes are omitted both by measuring the 
dispersion of the medians (or means) of job cells, with a weight of one per cell, and by 
using rolling samples. Column 1 shows that wage variation increased substantially in all 
three cities in each of the decades covered, particularly in the late 1970s. 
During the 1960s, inequality rose primarily as a result of increasing occupational 
differentials and .ILM variations. Widening ILM premia suggest that employers loosened 
their adherence to external market differentials over the decade. In the 1970s, 
occupational and ILM differentials continued to diverge.  In addition, wage prernia paid by 
employers underwent a large, apparently permanent increase in dispersion, reflecting a 
marked jump in the union wage differential, or in differentials between utilities, 
government, and durable-goods manufacturers on the one hand, and financial industry 
employers on the other.  During the 1980s, the only evident source of increasing inequality 
was the widening of occupational wage differentials, a trend that can be linked to 
increased returns to general education. Employer and ILM differentials showed little 
change during the decade. 
Two other components of wage dispersion did not contribute to the rise in 
inequality. First, no trend was obvious in the small component resulting from the 
covariance between occupation and employer.  Second, wage dispersion among workers 
within job cell in the. 1980s (the only period for which it can be measured) was negligible 
and showed no increase. 
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(1991), who conclude that within-plant wage dispersion accounted for most of the growth 
in inequality among nonproduction manufacturing workers between 1963 and 1986. For 
production workers, the role of between-plant wage dispersion and its growth was much 
stronger. 
III.  Did HRM Policy Changes Cause the Rising Inequality? 
HRM versus Non-HRM Explanations 
Perhaps the most frequently cited hypothesis for the rising wage inequality of the 
1980s is "deindustrialization," or the net creation of disproportionately  low- and high- 
wage employers or occupations. This is not essentially an HRM explanation.  Other non- 
HRM candidates include increased returns to skills or training (due to technological 
advances or international competition) and the rising inequality of training. 
The HRM  hypotheses are linked to two major trends in the labor market.  First, 
unionization has declined dramatically over the past three decades.  Since unionized 
establishments and industries have lower wage dispersion than their nonunion counterparts 
(Freeman [1980]), this trend is a natural suspect. Historically, unions have sought low 
wage dispersion within and among employers in order to enhance the cohesion of their 
bargaining units, to reduce labor-cost competition among employers, and to narrow 
supervisors' scope for adjusting wages in an unfair or arbitrary manner. 
Second, coincident with declining unionization, employers have implemented a 
variety of new human resource strategies in the past two to three decades.  In contrast to 
the union model, these practices include the institution of clear internal productivity- 
related incentives for workers, such as individual or group bonuses, merit-based raises, 
and profit-sharing plans, any of which could raise wage dispersion directly. In addition, 
the absence of unionization may allow employers to use internal wage levels as a 
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run). 
Industrial Restructuriny  Total Wage Vanatro  . . n 
The results obtained in this study allow rejection of a central non-HRM hypothesis 
as the sole source of rising wage dispersion. Because increases in dispersion over the past 
three decades can be seen even when occupations and employers are held constant, they 
cannot be a direct effect of deindustrialization alone.  This finding is consistent with results 
reported in Leonard and Jacobson (1990). Even if two workers did not change jobs over 
the entire sample period, if they started out in different jobs, their wages still would have 
diverged markedly.  This means that wage distributions diverged within existing firms  and 
occupations. 
Risin~  Returns to Training and Skills:  Variation amon? Occu~ations 
The recent increase in returns to education (see Bound and Johnson [1989]) has 
amplified occupational wage differences. When FRBC occupational differentials are 
regressed on the level of specific vocational preparation (SVP) and general educational 
development (GED) for the occupation in each year, returns to SVP are fairly flat over the 
period, with the exception of a jump in the mid-1970s. In contrast, the coefficient on 
GED rises consistently, except for a sharp drop-off in the mid-1970s, which is followed by 
rapid recovery over the 1980s. Results of the FRBC survey suggest that rising returns to 
general education are a major component of the increased inequality, while returns to 
vocational preparation are essentially unchanged. 
HRM policy has either accommodated a technologically driven increase in demand 
for educated labor or fueled the increase in demand through a reorganization of the 
American workplace. If  the latter holds, the growing inequality must be traceable in some 
part to changes in employers' HRM policies. 
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Employer wage differentials, which have been shown to account for a substantial 
portion of total wage variation (Groshen [1991a]), have been linked to observable 
employer characteristics (e.g., industry, firm size, and method of pay).  However, no 
single theoretical source has gained a consensus.  Possible explanations include unions' 
decreasing ability to remove wages from competition, or changes in either compensating 
differentials, the degree of  employee sorting, efficiency wages, or the implicit profit- 
sharing premia paid by employers. 
Most of the increase in the dispersion of employer differentials occurred in the 
second half of the 1970s. Among the five surveyed  employers showing both a large 
decline in their premia from 1974 to 1980 and an increased distance from the mean, four 
are banks and one is an insurer -- and all are nonunion. By contrast, among the 17 
employers with marked wage increases that moved farther from the mean, 14 are at least 
partly unionized (nine are durable-goods manufacturers, six are utility or telephone 
companies, three are government agencies, and one is a nondurable-goods manufacturer). 
This result is consistent with the burgeoning inflation and loose labor markets of  the 
1970s, as well as with the greater prevalence of cost-of-living indexing under unionization. 
Thus, the large increases in employer wage differentials in the late 1970s were due 
mainly to widening of  the union wage differential or differentials paid by durable-goods 
manufacturers and utilities,  and perhaps to the effects of  bank deregulation and the 
unionization of  federal jobs.  Among the many unanswered questions about this result is 
why the increase in variance among employers appears to be so long-lived. And how can 
the decline of union power be responsible, since, presumably, this would have reduced, 
not lifted, union wages? 
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The variation of ILM differentials across firms measures the lack of uniformity of 
internal pay relationships among them.  This component would have grown if workers' 
quest for job security in the high-unemployment periods of the late 1970s and early 1980s 
had insulated employers' internal labor markets from external pressures. Then, internal 
pay relationships could have deviated substantially from overall market averages and 
would have increased wage variation due to the ILM component. Alternatively, rapid 
technological change during these years could have created a temporary period of 
uncertainty, with relative pay relationships varying widely among firms. Finally, increases 
in employer wage differentials may have bought a degree of insulation from external 
market pay ratios, allowing corresponding increases in ILM variation. 
The pattern found in the FRBC sample suggests that the latter explanation is 
untenable, since the increased idiosyncrasy of intemal wage relationships during the 1960s 
and 1970s preceded  the increase in wage variation by employer. Instead, growth in this 
component may reflect a rise in uncertainty about market pay ratios, varying lags in 
adjustment to external changes, or greater insulation from the market due to workers' 
desire for job security. 
Biased Wage Chan~es:  Employer-Occupation Covariance 
Positive covariance indicates that companies with high wages also tend to employ 
workers in high-wage occupations. If this term grows while the distribution of jobs is held 
constant, it implies that firms with high or growing wages also employ more than their 
share of occupations with high or increasing wages.  Such a shift might occur if the use of 
efficiency wages has grown among employers with high-skill occupations, or if 
competitive pressures have reduced wages mostly for low-skill workers in low-wage 
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no trend over the period and thus is not a source of increasing inequality. 
Merit Pay:  Wage Variation within Job Cells 
The increased use of  merit raises (as opposed to uniform cost-of-living adjustments 
or promotions) might widen the range of wages paid by employers within occupation. 
The full distribution of wages within job cells, which is available for the 1980s, can be 
used to capture this effect, since about 80 percent of  the respondents reported that they 
implemented or strengthened their form of pay-for-performance and merit raises during 
the decade.  Nevertheless, the last column of  table 1 shows that wage variation within job 
cells was unchanged over this period. Furthermore, since the standard deviation of wages 
within job cells is quite low, even if this component were nonexistent in 1957, its 
appearance sometime before 1980 would not have increased the total variation by much. 
This finding does not rule out the possibility that merit pay can substantially affect 
individuals' wages; it merely suggests that merit pay systems probably have no greater 
association with higher wage inequality than do seniority-based systems. 
IV. Conclusion 
All  in all, HRM policy changes do not seem to be strongly implicated in the rising 
wage dispersion of the last three decades. The increased use of  performance-based raises 
and a decline in the union wage premium can be ruled out as causes, as can total reliance 
on the non-HRM hypothesis of  deindustrialization. Rising occupational differentials are 
likewise not an obvious result of  HRM policies, although widening ILM premia suggest 
some role for such policies in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Nevertheless, rising income disparity is likely to affect many aspects of  HRM 
practices.  In particular, the dramatic widening of occupational wage differentials means 
that workplaces will house employees with more disparate incomes than in the recent past. 
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pose distinct challenges to employers with highly bureaucratic or very flat wage structures. 
Employers may react to these pressures by fighting to maintain desired ILM ratios, 
but this could prove costly in terms of turnover or in the overall wage differential 
necessary to avoid excessive turnover.  Another strategy may be to spin off some top or 
bottom employees through contracting out for their services, or by breaking up the 
company into smaller, more-unifonn subsidiaries or establishments. Perhaps some of the 
downsizing and increased reliance on contracting out in the 1980s was a response to these 
pressures. 
Alternatively, employers may choose to redesign their personnel practices to 
accommodate the new ratios.  If  so, these inherently less cohesive wage structures may 
require a renewed emphasis on mobility-enhancing programs, such as in-house training. 
Finally, the scope of HRM itself could be altered significantly in the years ahead. 
Increased wage disparities may grant human resource managers greater latitude to manage 
their compensation strategies.  On the other hand, pressures from external occupational 
labor markets could narrow their latitude to the point that employers fmally become the 
"price-takers" economists have always assumed them to be. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 1 
Average Annual Rate of Change 
of the Standard Deviation of Log Wages 
Total  Between-Cell Components  Within 
Between Cells  Occupation  Employer  ILM  Covariance  Cells 
Source:  FRBC salary survey (see Groshen [  199  1  b]). 
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